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Congress enacted § 1113 to the Bankruptcy Code in 1984 in order to es-
tablish a standard for the rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements. But
the statute's ambiguous language has caused a split between the Second and
Third Circuits, and has precipitated a lengthy academic debate largely centered
on the interpretation of one word: "necessary." This debate has focused on
proper statutory interpretation as well as deeper concerns regarding the policy
goals behind the Bankruptcy Code. The present study reports data that indi-
cate that the different interpretations are irrelevant in practice. No matter how
"necessary" is defined, the result is always the same: debtors are able to reject
their collective bargaining agreements. This article concludes that § 11 13's am-
biguities need to be clarified such that courts have a clearer standard as to what
"necessary" means and how that necessity is to be measured.
INTRODUCTION
Bankruptcy scholars have long debated the proper treatment of collective
bargaining agreements in corporate reorganizations. Collective bargaining
agreements (CBAs) are typically short-term contracts between employers
and their labor unions, setting forth basic terms of employment such as wages
and benefits. While employers are not required to enter into CBAs with
their unions, once a CBA is adopted it is an unfair labor practice for the
employer to unilaterally change any of these core employment terms. In
bankruptcy, however, debtors may reject these OBAs under terms specified
in 11 U.S.C. § 1113.
The interpretation of § 1113 has spurred a debate concerning the treat-
ment of CBAs in corporate reorganizations. Some commentators have feared
that an overly pro-debtor interpretation of this statute would allow debtors
to use bankruptcy as a "union-busting" tool. In contrast, an overly labor-
friendly interpretation might prevent debtors from successfully emerging
from bankruptcy. This debate has taken concrete form thanks to a split be-
*J.D. 2008, Harvard Law School; Kauffman Legal Fellow. The author wishea to thank the Kauffman
Foundation for ita generoua aupport and to thank the following people for their comments: Lynn LoPucki,
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tween the Third and Second Circuits. Thus, scholarship has largely divided
as to which court has the better interpretation. Underlying this debate is an
assumption that the difference in legal standards actually makes a difference
in application.
This article presents data from an empirical study to test the above as-
sumption. Based on data from every large publicly traded company bank-
ruptcy between 2001 and 2007,1 the present study reveals that the outcome
of § 1113 motions was the same regardless of the legal standard applied: the
court granted the debtor's motion to reject its CBA. This article argues that
this result is the inevitable outcome of having an ambiguous pro-labor union
standard in a pro-reorganization Bankruptcy Code. While the statute at-
tempts to ensure that debtors can only reject their CBAs when rejection is
truly necessary, Congress failed to define what "necessary" means or how
courts are to make this determination. Consequently, Bankruptcy Courts
implementing a Bankruptcy Code designed to facilitate the rehabilitation of
debtors have little choice but to find rejection to be necessary.
This paper begins by presenting the language and background of § 1113.
Part 11 then discusses the different interpretations of § 1113 in both the
Third and Second Circuits, and reviews commentary regarding the merits of
each interpretation. Part III describes the data collection methodology for
the study reported in this article. Part IV lays out the findings of this study
and presents analysis arguing that the difference in legal standards has no real
impact on legal outcomes. And finally, Part V concludes.
I. BACKGROUND OF § 1113 OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
Collective bargaining agreements are short term contracts2 between em-
ployers and labor unions specifying such core employment issues as "wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment ."3 Since the enactment
of the National Labor Relations Act in 1935, federal labor laws have sought
to promote industrial peace by encouraging collective bargaining between
'Database of these cases was provided by Lynn LoPucki's Bankruptcy Research Database, available at
http://opucki.law.ucla.edu/bankruptcy-research.asp.
'See Kevin J. Murphy, The Determninants of Contract Duration in Collective Bargaining Agreements, 45
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 352, 357 (1992) (reporting results from an empirical study of collective bargain-
ing agreements that "[t]he mean length of contracts signed during the sample period is 32.8 months. The
standard deviation and the range of the data are 7.96 months and 4 years, respectively.")
'29 U.S.C. § 158(d). This section further describes the duty to bargain collectively:
For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the
mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet
at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written contract incorporating
any agreement reached if requested by either party . ...
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employers and employee representatives. 4 The role of the government in this
legal scheme is to allow workers the freedom to organize and bargain through
representatives.5 If the parties reach agreement on these terms, the law then
serves to provide enforcement of the CBA .6  If the employer modifies the
terms of the CBA before its expiration without following the guidelines set
forth in the act, it commits an -unfair labor practice" that will result in a
claim before the National Labor Relations Board.7
This policy favoring collective bargaining in labor relations runs into di-
rect conflict with bankruptcy policy when a unionized debtor files for bank-
ruptcy under Chapter 11. Chapter 11 promotes the reorganization of
businesses in order to preserve their going concern value.8 And one of the
primary tools for reorganization is the ability to reject burdensome con-
tracts.9 The Bankruptcy Code, as enacted in 1978, did not contain any spe-
cial provision for CBAs, and most courts treated these agreements as
executory contracts, such as sales contracts and leases.' 0 Nonetheless, as the
Supreme Court explained in NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, courts treated
CBAs differently due to their "special nature":
4See 29 U.S.C. § 151 ("It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the
causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these
obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining
and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation
of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their
employment or other mutual aid or protection.")
'NLRB. v. American Nar. I-as. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 401-2 (1952) ("The National Labor Relations Act is
designed to promote industrial peace by encouraging the making of voluntary agreements governing rela-
tions between unions and employers. The Act does not compel any agreement whatsoever between em-
ployees and employers. Nor does the Act regulate the substantive terms governing wages, hours and
working conditions which are incorporated in an agreement. The theory of the Act is that the making of
voluntary labor agreements is encouraged by protecting employees' rights to organize for collective bar-
gaining and by imposing on labor and management the mutual obligation to bargain collectively.")
'29 U.S.C. § 158(a) and (d) (making it an unfair labor practice to unilaterally change the terms in a
CBA) and 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (providing jurisdiction in federal district courts for suits for violations of
CBAs); see Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills. 353 U.S. 448, 451 (1957) (29 U.S.C. § 185(a) "is more
than jurisdictional . .. it authorizes federal courts to fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of
these collective bargaining agreements.")
7NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 747-48 (1962) ("Unilateral action by an employer without prior discus-
sion with the union does amount to a refusal to negotiate about the affected conditions of employment
under negotiation . . .. It follows that the Board may hold such unilateral action to be an unfair labor
practice in violation of § 8(a)(5), without also finding the employer guilty of over-all subjective bad faith.")
'NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528 (1984) ("The fundamental purpose of reorganization
is to prevent a debtor from going into liquidation, with an attendant loss of jobs and possible misuse of
economic resources.")
911 U.S.C. § 365.
'
0D3ouglas Bordewieck and Verne Countryman, The Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements by
Chapter 11 Debtors, 57 Ami. BANKR. L. J. 293, 294 (1983) ("courts now routinely hold that a collective
bargaining agreement is an executory contract which may be rejected in a bankruptcy proceeding.")
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Although there is no indication in § 365 of the Bankruptcy
Code that rejection of collective-bargaining agreements
should be governed by a standard different from that gov-
erning other executory contracts, all of the Courts of Ap-
peals which have considered the matter have concluded that
the standard should be a stricter one . .. . We agree with
these Courts of Appeals that because of the special nature of
a collective-bargaining contract, and the consequent -law of
the shop" which it creates, a somewhat stricter standard
should govern the decision of the Bankruptcy Court to allow
rejection of a collective-bargaining agreement."
Despite this agreement that CBAs merited special treatment in corporate
reorganizations, courts disagreed regarding what this special treatment should
be.' 2 Bildisco clarified this question by stating that Bankruptcy Courts
would allow debtors to reject their CBAs only "if the debtor can show that
the collective-bargaining agreement burdens the estate, and that after careful
scrutiny, the equities balance in favor of rejecting the labor contract."'13
On the same day as the Supreme Court issued its decision in Bildisco, a
bill was introduced in the House of Representatives to overrule it.'4 This
legislative initiative eventually resulted in the adoption of § 1113 of the
Bankruptcy Code. While the impetus for the bill was a pro-labor reaction to
Bildisco, the final law that emerged was a compromise between labor and
business interests and did not represent a clear victory for either side.'15
While § 1113 overruled Bildisco's most controversial holding-that a debtor
could unilaterally reject a CBA upon filing for bankruptcy-it codified the
general structure laid out in that decision: a debtor must first negotiate with
its unions before seeking court-ordered rejection of a CBA.'16
"NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 523-524 (internal citations omitted).
"
2See Bruce H. Charnov, The Uses and Misuses of the Legislative History of Section 1113 of the Bank-
Tuptcy Code, 40 SYRACUSE L. REV. 925, 934 (1989) (describing the pre-Bildisco, caselaw: "The circuit
courts employed at least three distinctly different standards before allowing rejection of a collective agree-
ment in a Chapter 11 proceeding.")
"3465 U.S. at 526.
'
4See In re Century Brass Products, Inc., 795 F.2d 265, 272 (2d Cir. 1986) ("In fact, on the same day
Bildisco was decided, Congressman Rodino introduced H.R. 4908 to 'clarify the circumstances under
which collective bargaining agreements may be rejected.' H.R. 4908, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 Cong.Rec.
H 809 (daily ed. February 22, 1984).")
"Michael St. Patrick Baxter, Is There a Claim for Damages from the Rejection of a Collective Bargain-
ing Agreement Under Section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code?, 12 BANK. DEy. J. 703, at 721-22 (1993)
("What started as a pro-labor bill in the House turned into a compromise bill among various interest
groups when it emerged from the Conference Committee. ... Thus, the enactment of section 1113 cannot
be considered an unqualified victory for either labor or management. Accordingly, it would be inappropri-
ate to construe section 1113 with either a pro-labor or a pro-management bias.")
16 NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 526 ("Before acting on a petition to modify or reject a
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Section 1113 imposes both procedural and substantive restrictions on the
bargaining process. 17 The procedural requirements are relatively straightfor-
ward-the debtor must meet with the union representative, make a proposal,
and provide the information necessary to evaluate the proposal. The substan-
tive provisions, on the other hand, are rather ambiguous and have sparked
controversy among commentators and the split among Circuit Courts. For
example, some scholars have considered what it means for the union to refuse
the debtor's proposed modifications "without good cause."18 Meanwhile,
others have examined whether a labor union receives a claim for damages
from a rejected CBA.19 But the bulk of this commentary has focused on the
meaning of "necessary." 20
collective-bargaining agreement, however, the Bankruptcy Court should be persuaded that reasonable ef-
forts to negotiate a voluntary modification have been made and are not likely to produce a prompt and
satisfactory solution. The NLRA requires no less. Not only is the debtor-in-possession under a duty to
bargain with the union under § 8(a)(5) of the NLRA, 29 U. S. C. § 158(a)(5) . . . but the national labor
policies of avoiding labor strife and encouraging collective bargaining, § 1, NLRA, 29 U. S. C. § 151,
generally require that employers and unions reach their own agreements on terms and conditions of em-
ployment free from governmental interference.")
1711 U.S.C. § 1113, which states in relevant part:
(b)(1) Subsequent to filing a petition and prior to filing an application seeking rejec-
tion of a collective bargaining agreement, the debtor in possession or trustee (here-
inafter in this section 'trustee" shall include a debtor in possession), shall-
(A) make a proposal to the authorized representative of the employees covered by
such agreement, based on the most complete and reliable information available at
the time of such proposal, which provides for those necessary modifications in the
employees benefits and protections that are necessary to permit the reorganization
of the debtor and assures that all creditors, the debtor and all of the affected parties
are trested fairly and equitably; and
(B) provide, subject to subsection (d)(3), the representative of the employees with
such relevant information as is necessary to evaluate the proposal.
(2) During the period beginning on the date of the making of a proposal provided
for in paragraph (1) and ending on the date of the hearing provided for in subsection
(d)(1), the trustee shall meet, at reasonable times, with the authorized representa-
tive to confer in good faith in attempting to reach mutually satisfactory modifica-
tions of such agreement.
(c) The court shall approve an application for rejection of a collective bargaining
agreement only if the court finds that-
(1) the trustee has, prior to the hearing, made a proposal that fulfills the require-
ments of subsection (b)(1);
(2) the authorized representative of the employees has refused to accept such pro-
posal without good cause; and
(3) the balance of the equities clearly favors rejection of such agreement.
i"For a discussion of the "good cause" element, see Marc. S. Kirschner, Willis J. Coldsmith, Lawrence
P. Gottesman, Deena B. Jenab, and Jay C. Swardenski, Tossing the Coin Under Section 1113: Heads or
Tails, the Union Wins, 23 SETON HALL L. REV. 1516 (1993).
ilBaxter, supra note 15, at 72 1-2.
"
0Daniel Keating, The Continuing Puzzle of Collective Bargaining Agreements in Bankruptcy, 3 5 WM-
& MARY L. REV. 503, 526 (1994) ("Without question the single most controversial question under sec-
tion 1113 has been how to define what modifications are necessary to permit the debtor's reorganiza-
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Section 1113 requires that, prior to seeking rejection, the debtor must
propose to its union 'those necessary modifications in the employees benefits
and protections that are necessary to permit the reorganization of the debtor
and assures that all creditors, the debtor and all of the affected parties are
treated fairly and equitably."21 Congress did not define what makes a modifi-
cation "necessary" nor what it means for the modifications to be "necessary to
permit" reorganization, and commentators immediately focused on this ambi-
guity.22 They noted that not only is the statute ambiguous, but that the
legislative history provides little to no guidance. With no House or Senate
Report concerning § 1113, attempts at discerning the legislative intent have
depended on a series of inconsistent statements from Congressional
representatives .2 3
As predicted, this statutory ambiguity caused divergent outcomes among
Bankruptcy Courts and then among Courts of Appeals. Notably, the two
most prominent corporate Bankruptcy Courts in the country soon found
themselves on opposing sides of this debate, as discussed below.
II. THIRD CIRCUIT VS. SECOND CIRCUIT
Congress used the word "necessary" twice in drafting § 1113: "the
debtor-in-possession . . . shall make a proposal . .. which provides for those
necessary modifications in the employees benefits and protections that are
necessary to permit the reorganization of the debtor ."2 4 The interpretation of
necessary" has thus posed two interpretative questions. First, "how neces-
sary?" And second, "necessary for what?"25 That is, must the modifications
be "essential" or something more akin to "helpful"? And must the modifica-
tion."); Christopher D. Cameron, How 'Necessary" Became the Mother of Rejection: An Empirical Look at
the Fate of Collective Bargaining Agreements on the Tenth Anniversary of Bankruptcy Code Section 1113,
34 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 841, 869 (1994) ("Exactly what 'necessary' means has been the subject of
vigorous judicial and academic debate.")
2111 USC 1113(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
22See e.g. James J. White, The Bildisco Case and the Congressional Response, 30 WAYNE L. REV. 1169,
at 1197 (1984) ("What will be the consequence of the enactment of section 1113? Because the language is
purposefully ambiguous and because it plays upon a vast and varied landscape, one cannot be sure. Surely
it makes the law measurably less certain; it will make the trial judge's decision more discretionary and
speculative; it will introduce greater guesswork into the lives of those who must advise management and
unions about their rights.")
"
3Bruce H. Charnov, The Uses and Misuses of the Legislative History of Section 1113 of the Bankruptcy
Code, 40 SYRACUSE L. REV. 925, 1002 (1989) (concluding that "other than this general desire to achieve a
better policy reconciliation [between bankruptcy and labor law], little is dispositive in the legislative
history."); see also Daniel S. Ehrenburg, Rejecting Collective Bargaining Agreements under Section 1113 of
the 1984 Bankruptcy Code: Resolving the Tension between Labor and Bankruptcy Law, 2 J. L. & POL'Y 55,
at 71 (1994) ("As a result, no definitive legislative history exists and legislative intent can only be inferred
from inconsistent statements by various Congress~persons contained in the Congressional Record.")
2411 U.S.C. § 11 13(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added).2 5See Cameron, supra note 20, at 869.
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tions prevent the debtor from entering liquidation, or is it enough that they
facilitate the reorganization?
The Third Circuit answered these questions in Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel
Corp. v. United Steelworkers of America by finding that the modifications
must be essential in order to prevent the debtor's liquidation .26
The Second Circuit, in Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Carey Transportation,
Inc., found that the modifications need not be essential and that they must
facilitate the reorganization: "the necessity requirement places on the debtor
the burden of proving that its proposal is made in good faith, and that it
contains necessary, but not absolutely minimal, changes that will enable the
debtor to complete the reorganization process successfully." 27
Even though the Second Circuit's interpretation has been more widely
accepted among the other circuitS,28 commentators continue to debate which
court has the better interpretation, as discussed below. Each side advances
both policy and statutory arguments in favor of its position. And each side
argues that its interpretation of "necessary" will have a drastic impact on
corporate reorganizations.
Those in favor of the Third Circuit's interpretation argue that it better
balances bankruptcy's pro-reorganization policy with the labor policy of
resolving disputes through collective bargaining.29 They argue that by re-
5 5Wheeli-ng-Pirrsburgh Steel Corp. v. United Steelworrkers of America, 791 F.2d 1074, 1088 (3d Cir.
1986) ("The 'necessary' standard cannot be satiafied by a mere showing that it would be desirable for the
trustee to reject a prevailing labor contract so that the debtor can lower its costs. Such an indulgent
standard would inadequately differentiate between labor contracts, which Congress sought to protect, and
other commercial contracts, which the trustee can disavow at will . .. . We reject the hypertechnical
argument that 'necessary' and 'essential' have different meanings because they are in different subsections.
The words are synonymous."); and at 1089 ("While we do not suggest that the general long-term viability
of the Company is not a goal of the debtor's reorganization, it appears from the legislators' remarks that
they placed the emphasis in determining whether and what modifications should be made to a negotiated
collective bargaining agreement on the somewhat shorter term goal of preventing the debtor's liquidation,
the mirror image of what is 'necessary to permit the reorganization of the debtor.'")
s" Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Carey Transportation, Inc., 816 F.2d 82, 90 (2d Cir. 1987).
25Anne J. McClain, Bankruptcy Code Section 1113 and the Simple Rejection of Collective Bargaining
Agreements: Labor Loses Again, 80 CEo. U. 191, 206 (1991) ("The majority of courts, however, have
rejected the Wheeling-Pittsburgh interpretation of the necessity element and have imposed a more liberal
interpretation."); lion. William T. Bodoh and Beth A. Buchanan, Ignored Consequences- The Conflicting
Policies of Labor Law and Business Reorganization and its Impact on Organized Labor, 15 Am. BANKR.
INsT. L. REV. 395, 409 (2007) ("the Second Circuit approach ... is the approach most widely adopted by
courts.")
'
9See e.g. Cary M. Roberts, Bankruptcy and the Union's Bargain: Equitable Treatmient of Collective
Bargaining Agreements, 39 STAN-. L. REV. 10 15, 1047 (1987) ("Courts should strictly construe the neces-
sity requirement, allowing only those contract modifications that must be made to avoid liquidation. Only
through such strict construction can the courts establish in bankruptcy the balance of power in labor-
management negotiations that approximates the relative strengths established by Congress in the
NLRA."); Babette A. Ceccotti, Lost in Transfornation: The Disappearance of Labor Policies in Appling
Section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code, 15 Ams. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 415, 431 (2007) ("Viewed under
Carey, the rejection standard tilts decidedly towards a bankruptcy-centered consideration about the pros-
2010) 9
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quiring debtors to propose only those bare minimal modifications to avoid
liquidation, the decision in Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. United Steel-
workers of America respects the balance of power between labor and manage-
ment created by the NLRA.3 0 At the same time, the Third Circuit still
permits debtors to reject burdensome CBAs when doing so is necessary to
prevent liquidation-and to avoid the job losses that would result. Propo-
nents of the Third Circuit approach argue that to define "necessary" as less
than "essential" would allow debtors to use the Chapter 11 process as a "col-
lective bargaining weapon," as any company in bankruptcy can easily estab-
lish that th cutting of labor costs would help to increase profits.3 1
Supporters of the Second Circuit's interpretation argue that Congress ac-
tually used the word "essential" in another part of § 1113, and that it is
therefore internally consistent to interpret "necessary" as something less than
essential.32  Additionally, they argue that to interpret " necessary" as "essen-
tial" would frustrate the duty to bargain in good faith. In this spirit, Truck
Drivers Local 807 v. Carey Transportation, Inc., held as follows:
Because the statute requires the debtor to negotiate in good
faith over the proposed modifications, an employer who ini-
tially proposed truly minimal changes would have no room
for good faith negotiating, while one who agreed to any sub-
stantive changes would be unable to prove that its initial
proposals were minimal.33
Policy-wise, commentators have argued that the Second Circuit interpre-
tation is more likely to permit successful reorganizations -thus avoiding liq-
uidations and consequent job losses. They contend that because the debtor
needs some breathing room to survive unforeseen events, a successful reor-
ganization requires that the debtor be allowed to make more than minimal
pects for a long-term reorganization and away from a labor policy frame of reference (for example, the
degree to which propoaed cuta invade the expectations reflected in the collective bargaining agreement or
are modulated by snap-backs or other compensatory featurea of interest to the union).").
'
0Roberts, supra note 29, at 1047.
"iMcClain, supra note 28, at 207 ("[The Carey] rationale is self-fulfilling. Since a Chapter I11 debtor ia
in aevere financial straits, any proposed cost reduction would likely help its reorganization and would,
therefore, be 'necessary.' The court's analysis in Carey Transportation supports this conclusion.").
5 2Charnov, supra note 23, at 1003 ("Even if the legislative history is discounted, the textual and
pragmatic good faith arguments raised in Allied Delivery point to the interpretation offered by the Carey
Transportation court as being more accurate. Interpreting section 1 113(b)(1)(A)'s necessity requirement
as less than the essential standard employed for interim modifications under section 1113(e) avoids the
rigidity aacribed to the REA Express standard of labor contract rejection."); Steven Kropp, Collective
Bargaining in Bankruptcy: Toward an Analytical Framework for Section 1113, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 697, 710-
11 (1993) ("Finally, as commentators have noted, Congress used the term 'essential' in subsection (e),
which authorizes emergency relief (interim) changes, but used 'necessary' in subsection (b)(1)(A). Con-
gress must therefore have intended a distinct and lower threshold where it used the word necessary.")
"
3Carey, 816 F.2d at 89.
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modifications. 3 4 In addition, by allowing more than minimal changes to the
CBA, the debtor can cut more costs, thus resulting in a greater payout to the
other general unsecured creditors whose vote may be critical to confirmation
of a plan .3 5 Finally, proponents of the Second Circuit's approach argue that it
enhances the debtor's long term financial health and is more consistent with
the Bankruptcy Code's goal of approving plans that will ensure the emerging
company's survival. 36
These arguments about whether the Third or Second Circuit has prop-
erly interpreted the word 'necessary" each assume that the difference in legal
standards actually matters. That is, they assume that debtors will have
greater success rejecting their CBAs in the Second Circuit than in the Third.
A secondary assumption is that the difference in legal standards would im-
pact a unionized debtor's decision of where to file for bankruptcy. Large
corporations can effectively forum shop their bankruptcy filings, due in part
to the Bankruptcy Code's venue provisions and to the nature of corporate
groups.3 7 Presumably, therefore, the difference in legal standards would make
it more likely that a unionized debtor would file for bankruptcy in the Second
Circuit than in the Third .38
To assess whether the difference in legal standards actually impacts cor-
34See Carlos J. Cuevas, Necessary Modifications and Section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Search for
the Substantive Standard for Modification of a Collective Bargaining Agreement in a Corporate Reorganiza-
tion, 64 Am. BANKR. L.. 133, 191 (1990).
"Keating, supra note 20, at 533 ("The Carey standard of 'necessary,' which allows greater cuts in
union wages than merely those absolutely necessary to avoid liquidation, is more likely to lead to a con-
firmed plan of reorganization. The reason that the Carey standard will have this effect is that the Carey
definition of 'necessary' is more likely to allocate at least some of the gains of the debtor's going-concern
surplus to the unsecured creditors who must vote on the debtor's plan of reorganization.")
"
6This is known as the "feasibility" requirement for the confirmation of a plan of reorganization, found
in 11 U SCA § 1129 (a)(1 1) ("Confirmation of the plan is not likely to be followed by the liquidation, or
the need for further financial reorganization, of the debtor or any successor to the debtor under the plan,
unless such liquidation or reorganization is proposed in the plan."); Cuevas, supra note 34, at 192 ("The
feasibility requirement of section 1129 must be borne in mind in determining whether the proposed modi-
fications to the collective bargaining agreement are necessary to permit reorganization. It is vital to ex-
amine the pro-posed modifications to a collective bargaining agreement in terms of the long-term financial
stability of the debtor.")
"7The Bankruptcy Code's venue requirements, 28 U.S.C. § 1408, allow a debtor to file for bankruptcy
at the (1) location of the debtor's residence, (2) location of principal place of business, (3) location of the
principal assets, or (4) the location of a chapter 11 case involving an "affiliate, general partner, or partner-
ship." As noted by Professor LoPucki, a large corporate debtor can use this last option as a "venue hook"
to file for bankruptcy almost anywhere. LYNN LoPUCKi, COURTING FAILURE: How THE COMPETITION
FOR BIG CASES IS CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM 37 (2005) ("A venue hook enables a corporate
group to pull itself into any court in which any of its constituent corporations can set the hook. For large
corporate groups, that can include almost any bankruptcy court in the United States.")
"This assumption led many to predict that Chrysler and Ceneral Motors would choose to file their
bankruptcies in the Southern District of New York, within the Second Circuit, instead of in Delaware,
within the Third Circuit. Cf. Barbara Kiviat, "CM's Potential Bankruptcy: Shopping for a Venue," April
9, 2009, http://www.time.coim/time/business/article/0,8599,18o7,o.html.
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porate reorganizations, it is necessary to look not only at the outcomes in
bankruptcies in each circuit but also at the practice of forum shopping. Prior
to the present study, data has been insufficient to answer these questions.
Although this is not the first empirical study on § 1113 motions, it is the
first to gather a large enough sample to analyze the impact of the different
legal standards.
The first study of § 1113 was conducted in 1994 by Professor Christo-
pher Cameron .391 He focused on thirty-eight Bankruptcy Court decisions40
between the years 1984 and 1993.41 Although he gathered data on the loca-
tion of the bankruptcy filings,42 he did not analyze the impact of the different
legal standards on outcomes. Instead, he tested three different hypotheses: (i)§ 1113 has led to fewer rejected CBAs since its passage in 1984;43 (ii)
§ 1113's procedural steps are more important than the substantive ones;44
and (iii) courts are more willing to reject a CBA if the debtor bargains but
fails to reach a negotiated agreement.45 By comparing the percentage of deci-
sions in his study that resulted in a rejected CBA with a similar "rejection
rate" reported by Professor James White in a pre-§ 1113 study, Cameron
concluded that § 1113 had a pro-labor impact.46 He found that after the
39Cameron, supra note 20.
401d. at 886-87 ("The study examined forty-six reported bankruptcy court decisions in which a debtor
filed at lesat one section 111i3 application: thirty-eight decisions in which complete contract rejection was
sought under section 11 13(c), and twenty in which interim modification of the contract was sought under
section i11i3(e). Applications for rejection rather than modification of collective bargaining agreements
draw more critical fire, so the study focused on the thirty-eight decisions under section 11i13(c).")
4iId. at 878 ('The study examined every bankruptcy court decision reported between July 10, i984
and July 10, i993 in which the debtor-employer filed an application for relief from the obligations of a
collective bargaining agreement under section ii1i3."); and at 879 ("For purposes of the study, the term
,reported,' when used in referring to reported bankruptcy court decisions, has two dimensions. First, it
includes all section ii1i3 bankruptcy court decisions published or otherwise made available through the
facilities of the Bureau of National Affairs, Commerce Clearing House, Matthew Bender Company, Mead
Data Corporation, and West Publishing Company. It was assumed that West's Bankruptcy Reporter was
the most widely relied-upon reporting service. Consequently, the study examined the version of every
decision reported there and used the other services to examine additional decisions not reported by West.
Second, 'reported' includes all un-reported bankruptcy court decisions for which there were related re-
ported appellate decisions (by district courts, bankruptcy appellate panels, and circuit courts of appeal,
where applicable) providing significant data about what happened below when the bankruptcy court was
presented with a section iii13 application.")
"I1d. at 890 ('Close to two-thirds of the decisions were reported by bankruptcy courts in the Second,
Sixth, and Seventh Circuits, which may reflect the financial distress suffered by residents of the industrial
Midwest and Northeast during the 1980's. By contrast, no section 11 13(c) decisions at all were reported




461d. at 895-96 ("In sum, the study shows that the rate of rejection has declined about nine percentage
points since the enactment of the statute-from about sixty-seven percent during the period i975- i984 to
about fifty-eight percent during the period 1984-1993. This is a substantial, if not radical, improvement in
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enactment of §11 13, debtors were able to reject their CBAs in 58% of all
cases, compared to 67% of the cases prior to 1984.47 Examining the relative
importance that courts seemed to place on each of § 111 3's requirements, he
concluded that courts put the most emphasis on the "necessary" standard.48
Finally he found that courts were more likely to grant rejection when debtors
participated in a greater number of bargaining sessions.49
The United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) later per-
formed a study on Chapter 11 bankruptcies to measure the impact of the
2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act and the
Pension Protection Act of 2006 on corporate reorganizations. 50 This study
examined all 115 publicly traded companies identified by the SEC as having
filed for bankruptcy between 2004 and 2006.51 It found that eight of the
twenty-eight, or 29%, of the debtors with CBAs sought to reject the labor
agreements in bankruptcy, and that these § 1113 motions generally resulted
in negotiated modifications.52 While this GAO report presents a census of
Chapter 11 cases with § 1113 motions, as opposed to Professor Cameron's
study, it did not examine where these cases were filed. Additionally, this
study involved a small sample of only eight cases with § 1113 motions.
the prospects for the survival of collective bargaining agreements in Chapter 1 1.")(companing his results
with those of Professor James White in The Bildisco Case and the Congressional Response, 30 WAYNE L.
REV. 1169 (1984)).
47Cameron, supra note 20, at 895-96.
"I1d. at 906-7 ("Therefore, it can safely be concluded that the idea shared by so many commentators is
correct: the single most important step that a debtor must climb to secure rejection under section 1113 (c)
is establishing that his or her proposed modifications are 'necessary' to permit reorganization. Or, stated
another way, in the average bankruptcy court decision regarding a section 11 13(c) application, step three
is the most important of all the steps in the decision-making process.")
491d. at 911-12 ("The data suggest a strong relationship between unsuccessful bargaining and the likeli-
hood of rejection after three or more bargaining sessions. Of the nineteen decisions in which rejection was
granted and for which data were available, thirteen involved three or more unsuccessful bargaining ses-
sions. By contrast, of the eleven decisions in which rejection was denied and for which data were availa-
ble, just three involved three or more such sessions. The conclusion: bankruptcy courts 'reward' debtors
who have engaged in actual bargaining sessions that do not produce contract settlements by granting their
applications for rejection.")
"
0U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MAN-Y FACTORS AFFECT THE TREATMENT OF PENSION AND
HEALTH BENEFITS IN CHAPTER 11 BANKRUPTCY (2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d071 101.pdf.
"Id. at 11 ("Reviewed publicly available court documents of the 115 public companies identified by
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as having filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy in the years
before and after BAPCPA's general enactment date-October 17, 2005, (76 companies before, 39 after),
including motions to change benefits, such as defined benefit (DB) plans, retiree health benefits, and those
protected by collective bargaining agreements (CBA). We also reviewed whether employers sought ap-
proval to continue benefit programs. The scope of analysis was limited to public companies due to data
limitations and is not generalizable to all companies in bankruptcy.')
"I1d. at 34 ('Eight of the 28 employers that reported union representation sought to modify or reject
their CBAs. Generally, employers and unions negotiate the changes to the CBA. Negotiations often in-
clude wage and benefit cuts.")
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These two previous studies present important insights into the use of
§ 1113 in corporate reorganizations, but they do not provide sufficient data
to analyze the importance of the differing legal standards in the two most
important corporate reorganization courts. The study reported in this article,
as described below, seeks to contribute the necessary data to address this
issue.
III. DATA
The study reported in this article is based on data from every Chapter 11
filing of large publicly traded companies between 2001 and 2007, as identified
through Professor Lynn LoPucki's Bankruptcy Research Database .5 3  This
database provided certain basic facts about each case, including the date of
filing, the district in which it was filed, and whether the case was "forum
shopped" - meaning that it was filed in a district other than where the
debtor had its headquarters.
Building on Professor LoPucki's data, this study coded each filing for the
presence of a unionized labor force. This information was gathered in three
ways: (1) by examining the debtors' last pre-bankruptcy SEC Form 10-K for
statements indicating that its employees were represented by labor unions; 54
(2) by examining the bankruptcy docket report for debtors' motions to reject
a collective bargaining agreement;55 and (3) by examining news reports after
the bankruptcy filing.56 Finally, each case was coded for the presence of mo-
tions to rej ect a CBA. This was done principally by searching the bank-
ruptcy case docket for such motions, either as motions pursuant to § 1113 or
simply motions to reject a CBA.57 The search was supplemented with news
searches for collective bargaining agreements in bankruptcy. 58
"1Database of these cases was provided by Lynn LoPucki's Bankruptcy Research Database, available at
http://opucki.law.ucla.edu/bankruptcy-research.asp.
"
4An examination of the latest 10-K for the year prior to filing bankruptcy was performed, and in-
cluded a review of the subsection "Employees." The company was coded as having no collective bargain-
ing agreements if the 1O-K made no menrion of labor unions or CBAs, or if the company specifically said
that it was not subject to any collective bargaining agreements, that its employees were not unionized, or
that only a very small minority of the employees was unionized. The company was coded as having a
collective bargaining agreement if it said that its employees were unionized (unless it said this group was a
small minority).
5"Dockets were accessed from PACER, either through Bloomberg's docket search or directly from the
PACER website itself.
"
6A search of news source was performed in two databases on Bloomberg, both the labor union news
and bankruptcy news databases. A search was performed in the bankruptcy news database for "collective
bargaining". A search in the labor database was performed for "bankrupt*" and "collective bargain*."
571f the docket, as accessed on PACER, had a motion to reject the collective bargaining agreement, this
was coded as a yes. Motions for interim relief from collective bargaining agreements were not counted.
To search for motions, a word search was performed for the words '111 3" (for a § iii13 motion), "collec-
tive (for collective bargaining), and "union" (for any mention of labor unions.)
"
8 Supra note 56.
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Data were collected as to how many CBAs were affected by motions in
each of the subject cases. In some instances, the debtor tried to reject as
many as ten or more of its CBAs. In others, the debtor only attempted to
reject one. For each of the affected CBAs, the name of the union involved
and the outcome of the motion were recorded.
This study contributes to the previous studies by providing a complete
census of large Chapter 11 filings over seven years in a recent time span. The
census provides a broader picture of the CBAs in bankruptcy-not only the
rejection rate, but also how often these motions are filed and how often they
settle. In addition, this study contributes data about each individual CBA
affected by these motions.
The data in this study do pose a limitation, however. They represent
only a thin sliver of all Chapter 11 filings during this time period, as large
corporate bankruptcies are the exceptions more than the norm.59 The out-
comes in these big cases may not be representative of the treatment of labor
contracts in all Chapter 11 cases. It is possible that smaller companies are
better able to negotiate with their unions-perhaps because they have fewer
unions with whom to negotiate. It is also possible that courts may treat
larger cases differently due to the added pressure of trying to keep large com-
panies afloat through the bankruptcy process. Something akin to the "too big
to fail" mentality may impact outcomes, as courts may feel additional pressure
to keep these large companies out of Chapter 7 liquidation.
Despite the above limitations, the data present the complete picture of
large Chapter 11 filings during the covered period. And partially because of
this limitation, the data carry even greater weight. If courts do indeed feel an
additional pressure when handling these larger cases, this present analysis
will provide a stress test of § 1113's ability to balance the bankruptcy and
labor policies inherent when a debtor seeks to reject a CBA.
IV. FINDINGS
Even though the debate concerning the appropriate interpretation of the
necessity requirement has assumed that the different legal standards in the
Third and Second Circuits would produce different outcomes, this study
finds that courts granted every motion under § 1113 without regard to the
applicable legal standard.6 0 This finding suggests that the difference in legal
standards made no difference in practice. The outcome was "debtor-friendly"
"
9 Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Success of Chapter 11: A Challenge to the
Critics, 107 MieN. L. REV. 603, 609 (2009) ('In the 2002 sample [of Chapter 11 filings], 15% are tiny
casea, with less than $100,000 in asaets, while at the other end of the spectrum 6% involve over $100
million in asseta.')
'Only once, in the Southern Diatrict of New York, did a court deny a debtor's motion-but the court
then granted the debtor's renewed motion. In re Delta Air Lines, 342 BR 685 (Bankr. S.DN.Y. 2006)
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whether the Bankruptcy Court applied the "pro-labor" or "pro-debtor" inter-
pretation of -necessary."
This section first presents an overview of the use of § 1113 motions and
finds that about 20% of unionized debtors filed a § 1113 motion. Presenting
data concerning Chapter 11 filings in Delaware and the Southern District of
New York, this study finds no significant difference except with respect to
the settlement rate of motions. Not only did the difference in legal standards
fail to make a difference in litigated motions, but it also did not appear to
impact debtors' venue selection. An almost equal number of debtors filed
§ 1113 motions in New York as in Delaware. This section then concludes
that the two legal standards have converged in practice, and that they have
done so in a way that makes the necessity requirement effectively
meaningless.
A. OVERVIEW: SECTION 1113 MOTIONS To REJECT CBAs
In this study of large Chapter 11I bankruptcies, 136 of 316 companies had
unionized workforces. The debtor filed at least one motion to reject a CBA
in thirty of these cases (representing 22%7 of the unionized debtors), a per-
centage not far from the 29% reported in the GAO study.6' In the vast
majority of cases, the debtor did not need to avail itself of § 1113. It may not
have needed to modify its CBAs-perhaps because it could restructure with-
out modifications, because the Chapter 11 filing may have resulted in a liqui-
dation of the business, or because the debtor may have been able to negotiate
modifications out of court.
These thirty debtors that sought to reject a CBA involved a total of 103
different § 1113 motions. The majority of these motions were settled. The
debtor and the labor unions reached settled agreements for 62 of these 103
CBAs. For nine other CBAs, the § 1113 motions were never ruled on be-
cause the debtor failed to reorganize. All of the remaining thirty-two CBAs
were rejected. Only once did a court deny a debtor's § 1113 motion, and
even then the debtor was able to reject the CBA upon filing a second
motion.62
B. SECOND CIRCUIT vs. THIRD CIRCUIT
Although conventional wisdom holds that the Second Circuit case law is
more pro-management while the Third Circuit is more pro-union, every liti-
gated motion allowed the debtor to reject its CBA, regardless of whether the
case was filed in the Southern District of New York or Delaware. As men-
(denying the debtor's § 1113 motion) and 351 BR. 67 (approving the debtor's renewed motion three
months later.)
"
1U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 50, at 34.
"
2This involved In re Delta Airlines, as atated supra note 60.
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tioned above, only once did a court deny even an initial § 1113 motion, and
that was in the Delta Airlines restructuring in the "pro-debtor" Southern
District of New York.63 While these results do not indicate that the differ-
ence in legal standards was entirely irrelevant, they do indicate that the dif-
ference in legal standards did not affect the ultimate outcome: every litigated
motion resulted in a rejected CBA.
Not only were debtors successful in rejecting their CBAs regardless of
legal standard, but the difference in legal standards does not appear to have
driven more unionized debtors to file in the Southern District of New York.
In fact, more unionized debtors shopped into Delaware than into New York.
Of the sixty-two unionized debtors that shopped into either New York or
Delaware, thirty-seven filed in Delaware and twenty-five in New York. And
among these unionized debtors that shopped into Delaware and New York,
five New York debtors filed § 1113 motions compared to six in Delaware.6 4
If one accepts the assumption that large publicly traded companies have
virtually limitless options on where to file-and all the debtors in this study
are of this sort-then it does not appear that the difference in legal standards
promoted forum shopping. Thus, the difference in legal standards does not
appear to have affected either the outcome of litigated motions or debtors'
forum selection decision.
The one significant difference between the cases filed in the Southern
District of New York and those filed in Delaware concerns the settlement
rate of § 1113 motions. In the five New York cases, the debtors filed a total
of twenty § 1113 motions. In the six Delaware cases, the debtors filed a
total of twelve such motions. Nearly 85% of the New York motions were
settled, compared to only 58% of the motions in Delaware .6 5 (see Figure 1).
63.~e supra note 60 and text at note 62.
64The following debtors filed in the Southern District of New York: Dana Corporation (Docket No.
06-10354), DPH Holding Corp., at al. (Docket No. 05-44481), Delta Air Lines, Inc. (Docket No. 05-
17923), Northwest Airlines Corporation (Docket No. 05-17930), and Tower Automotive Inc. (Docket
No. 05-10578). The following filed in Delaware: Muma Services, Inc. (Docket No. 01-0926), Advanced
Glasafiber Yarns, LLC (Docket No. 02-13615), Rouge Industries, Inc. (Docket No. 03-13272), American
Class Voyages Co. (Docket No. 01-10954), Kaiser Aluminum Corporation (Docket No. 02-10429), and
Trans World Airlines, Inc. (Docket No. 01-0056).
6 5Seventeen of the twenty § 1113 motions in New York were settled, compared to seven of the
thirteen motions in Delaware. This difference is statistically significant with chi' = 3.86, p =.05
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Figure 1: Outcomes of § 1113 Motions on CBAs, in New York and
Delaware Cases












NY (n=20) DE (n=12)
C. ANALYSIS
The different legal standards regarding the rejection of CBAs in the Sec-
ond and Third Circuits has made little difference in application, despite the
difference in settlement rates. Even though the Second and Third Circuits
continue to apply different standards, the results of § 1113 motions indicate
that these standards have effectively converged.
The higher settlement rate in motions filed in New York may indicate
that the different legal standards have impacted the parties' perception of
their bargaining leverage. Labor unions may be more inclined to settle when
negotiating in the shadow of the Second Circuit's standard.66 In addition,
although not verifiable by the data here, it is possible that the different legal
standards affected not only the rate of settlements but also the terms of those
settlements.
The impact upon settlement rates suggests that labor unions and their
debtor-employers perceive the applicable legal standard as relevant. None-
theless, the outcome of the litigated motions -resulting in ultimate victory
for the debtor in every case-suggests that the legal standards are actually
irrelevant. As between the Second and Third Circuits, different interpreta-
tions of § 1113 produce the same results. In effect, their different legal Stan-
dards have converged.
Convergence in legal standards might generally represent a positive devel-
opment, especially in a field like bankruptcy that involves a uniform code. In
66See Linda Babcock, Henry S. Farber, Cyntis Fobian, and Eldar Shafir, Forming Beliefs about Adjudi-
cated Outcomes: Perceptions of Risk and Reservation Values, 15 INT'L REv. L. & EcoN. 289, 290 (1995)
("In negotiations where impasses are resolved via a dispute resolution mechanism in which a third party
makes a binding decision (e.g., the court system, arbitration), beliefs about a potential adjudicated outcome
are central in determining the negotiating environment."); cf Mnookin and Kornhauser, Bargaining in the
Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE U. 950, 978 (1979).
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this case, however, the convergence of legal standards regarding § 1113 has
resulted in one-sided, pro-debtor outcomes that are inconsistent with the
statutory intent. This bankruptcy code provision was intended to provide
some extra protection for CBAs. As discussed above, the precise level of
protection is unclear. But the fact that every large corporate debtor during a
seven year period was able to reject its CBAs suggests that the statute has
provided very little protection at all. Section 1113 may have imposed addi-
tional costs on debtors seeking to reject their CBAs, but it has not kept any
debtor from rejecting a CBA. In essence, § 1113's requirements were to
serve as a gatekeeper for motions to reject CBAs, but the data reported here
indicate that the gatekeeper has let everyone through.
This convergence in legal standards with decidedly pro-debtor results
should also cause concern because it is alarmingly consistent with the fears of
forum shopping scholars.67 Because large corporate groups can forum shop
their reorganizations, these scholars fear that in order to attract these cases,
Bankruptcy Courts will adopt pro-debtor procedures and interpretations that
will gradually result in a "race to the bottom."68 While the data in this paper
cover too short a time span to indicate any trends indicating a race to the
bottom, the data are consistent with these theories, especially when com-
pared with the results of Professor Cameron's 1994 study reporting that
some motions were denied.
Even though the data in this study are consistent with the court competi-
tion theory, this article suggests that a better explanation for the collapsing of
the legal standards is § 111 3's ambiguous language. By failing to define "nec-
essary" or to provide any guidance for measuring necessity, courts are left
with little choice but to ultimately find that all proposed modifications are
necessary and to grant these motions.69 Granting these motions is not only
consistent with the bankruptcy policy of promoting reorganizations, but it
also represents the less risky choice for courts. If a court grants the debtor's
motion, wages will be cut and some jobs will be lost, but the debtor will
more likely survive. In contrast, if a court denies a motion for rejection, the
debtor may be forced into liquidation and everyone will lose employment.
Absent more direct language in the statute telling courts what is required to
61See LYNN LoPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: How THE COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS COR-
RUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM (2005).
651d.at 123-35; see also Theodore Eisenberg & Lynn M. LoPucki, Shopping for Judges: An Empirical
Analysis of Venue Choice in Large Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 967, 1002-3 (1999).
69Judge Hard in, inl his opinion denying Comalr's motion to reject its CBA, described § 1113 as "saurely
[one of the most unusual provisions in the Bankruptcy Code or any other statute because of the remark-
able degree of subjective discretion which a bankruptcy court must exercise in order to carry out its
mandate." In re Delta Air Lines, 342 BR. 685, 691 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006)
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prove "necessity," rational decision making compels courts to allow debtors
to reject their CBAs.
Clarification to § 1113 should not oniy define "necessary," but should
also provide objective means for measuring necessity. The data reported here
suggest that merely defining "necessary" to mean "essential" or "important"
would not effect any change in outcome. Instead, this provision needs to
include some sort of objective requirements for measuring necessity. One
such provision, as has been proposed to Congress, would be to require that
proposed modifications be of a limited duration.7O Such duration limits
would provide some assurance that the proposed changes would apply only
during the debtor's financial difficulty.
Alternatively, Congress could amend § 1113 to ensure that labor unions
have a claim for damages resulting from a rejected CBA, in the same way that
a landlord would have a claim for damages under § 365 for rejection of its
lease. Currently, the Code is silent on the union's right to receive such dam-
ages.7 ' If § 1113 clarified this-and provided a means for measuring these
damages-the statute could provide another way to balance bankruptcy and
labor policies.
By clarifying not only the standard for rejecting CBAs but also both how
to determine if that standard is met and what the consequences of rejection
should be, Congress could not only provide courts with more guidance, but it
could also alter the bargaining process between employers and their unions.
V. CONCLUSION
Even though § 1113 contains ambiguous language and has no definitive
legislative history, its text clearly indicates that Congress preferred the out-
come of negotiated settlements to labor disputes. This preference may reflect
a belief that settlements are more consistent with federal labor policy, which
seeks to promote collective bargaining and, more generally, to remove govern-
ment presence from labor relations. Nonetheless, § 1113 does more than en-
courage negotiation. It also creates the substantive law that provides the
parameters for that negotiation. And that substantive law is defectively
ambiguous.
Legal scholars have argued about what has been perceived as the major
point of ambiguity: what does § 1113 mean when it requires debtors to pro-
pose only necessary modifications? These scholars were rightly concerned
about the impact of the substantive law on outcomes, and indirectly, on nego-
7 0See e.g. Hearings before the H. Comm. on the judiciary, Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative
Law, 111 th Cong. (Dec. 16, 2009)(statement of Marshall Huebner, co-chair of Insolvency and Restructur-
ing Department at Davis, Polk & Wardwell LLP), 2009 WL 4829091.
7 See Baxter, supra note 15.
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tiations. However, the study reported in this paper suggests they overesti-
mated the significance of the competing interpretations of "necessary." Not
only did the different interpretations produce the same outcomes, but the
necessity requirement had no impact on the outcomes.
While the necessity requirement of § 1113 needs clarification, the statute
must also provide a means for determining if a debtor's proposals meet that
standard. In addition, § 1113 needs clarification concerning the consequences
of a rejected CBA. By providing these clarifications, Congress would create
greater uniformity in the Bankruptcy Code. In turn, such uniformity would
promote more effective labor negotiations. Until Congress enacts such clari-
fications, courts will have little choice but to continue to err on the side of
encouraging corporate reorganization, and employers and unions must con-
tinue to negotiate in the shadow of a pro-debtor law.
